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1 Introduction
The need for an international investment agreement (IIA) has been a much
debated and highly controversial issue for at least a decade1. There are now
initiatives to place this theme on the agenda for the new round of negotiations
in the World Trade Organization (WTO). From a host country perspective,
an important argument in favor of an IIA is the need to limit the potentially
harmful incentives-based competition for foreign direct investment (FDI).
The result of such competition could be that the investor receives most of the
value added from the investment, leaving little benefit for the host country.2
Today’s system of bilateral investment agreements cannot deal with the issue
of policy competition for investment. The problem is international in nature
and the solution to the problem must therefore be found in an international
agreement.
The present paper analyses the consequences of an IIA that restricts po-
tential host countries’ use of incentives to attract FDI. Our main interest is
the conflicting interests that may arise between host countries on such an
agreement. Their interests may of course conflict for a number of reasons,
including diﬀerences in the level of economic development, geographical loca-
tion, and whether or not the countries enjoy privileges from existing bilateral
or regional agreements. In the present study we focus on diﬀerence in market
size as the source of conflict.
Our study shows that a large country may have a greater incentive to sub-
sidize foreign investment inflows. Large countries can therefore be expected
to win the policy competition for FDI. An agreement limiting countries’ abil-
ity to take part in policy competition for FDI may therefore not be in the
larger country’s interest.
There may, however, be strong arguments for the multinational enterprise
(MNE) to invest in the larger country even in the absence of subsidies. After
all, the larger country provides a larger local market in which the MNE can
sell its products. If market size provides a suﬃciently strong locational ad-
vantage for the large country, it may indeed be in the interest of this country
to support the introduction of an international investment agreement. With
1For an excellent overview of the debate and earlier attempts at reaching such an
agreement, in particular the failed MAI-initiative by the OECD in the mid-1990s, see
Nunnenkamp and Pant (2003).
2For a discussion of the adverse eﬀects of incentives competition for FDI, see Oman
(2001).
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the implementation of the agreement, the large country will still attract FDI,
and without having to engage in a costly policy competition.
Small countries, too, may dislike a restriction on their use of investment
incentives. An investment subsidy may be a necessary tool to attract FDI
that would otherwise be limited to countries with larger markets. In this
way, the small country may be able to capture spillovers associated with
such investments.
We analyse how these interests are aﬀected by technological spillovers
from the foreign investment, intra-regional trade costs, spillover intensity,
technological gap between MNE and local firms, and relative country size.
The theoretical framework is a simple, partial-equilibrium model with im-
perfect competition.
Our paper is closely related to Fumagalli (2003). She considers a region
consisting of two host countries, diﬀerentiated by the technology of their local
firms. Technological spillovers from FDI are stronger in the less advanced
country, because the technological gap between the investing firm and the
local firm is greater there. The two countries are perfectly integrated; there
are no trade costs and prices are equalized. When the MNE invests in the
region, the investment is necessarily located in the more advanced country,
since this limits the extent of spillovers. The firm’s incentive to protect its
technology by locating FDI in a region where spillovers are less pronounced,
is a “protection” argument for the locational choice of FDI. Allowing for
investment subsidies shifts investment to the less advanced country, since
this country has more to gain from the investment in terms of spillovers
to the local industry. Since the investment subsidy in this way directs the
investment to the country with the higher spillovers, aggregate welfare in the
two countries may increase. Hence, prohibiting investment subsidies may be
a bad idea.
As stated above, our focus is on diﬀerences in country size as the source
of conflict. Diﬀerent from Fumagalli, we consider segregated markets. In this
way we introduce a “proximity” argument in favor of locating in the larger
market. If this argument is suﬃciently strong, the MNE may prefer to invest
in the larger market even though spillovers are also greater there. Moreover,
our analysis also opens up for the MNE investing in both countries. Thus our
paper introduces some mechanisms not present in the article by Fumagalli,
and opens up for a much more complex set of location outcomes, and hence a
richer welfare analysis. For instance, in our study the impact of government
intervention on the investment decision of the MNE and on national welfare is
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far from trivial. Depending on where the MNE would locate in the absence of
subsidies, whether subsidies oﬀered are large enough to oﬀset initial location
advantages, and whether a country is able to attract a second investment in
the region, both the small and the large country can gain or lose from an IIA.
The focus of our analysis is on the potential conflict of interests that host
countries may have on the issue of an IIA, rather than on aggregate welfare
eﬀects.
Barros and Cabral (2000) also emphasize the proximity argument in the
context of a subsidy competition for FDI. In their paper, alleviating unem-
ployment is the benefit of attracting FDI and the location decision of the
MNE is driven by the size of the market on one hand and employment gains
on the other hand. They conclude that investment subsidies may increase
total welfare, but that there is necessarily a conflict of interest between the
two countries in the absence of side payments. However, they do not take
into account spillover eﬀects on local firms, so that they cannot capture the
“proximity-protection” trade-oﬀ described in this paper. Moreover, like Fu-
magalli, they consider only single-plant investment in the region.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model. Section 2.1 addresses the case without government intervention,
and 2.2 the eﬀect of government intervention on location. The main topic
of the paper, namely the welfare implications of an investment agreement, is
presented in 2.3. Section 3 discusses technological diﬀerences between host
countries. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a region consisting of two countries, A and B. Demand in country
J = A,B is given by
QJ = σJ (1− pJ) , (1)
where QJ is the quantity demanded, pJ is the market price in country
J , and σJ is a parameter denoting the size of the market. The two markets
diﬀer in size, with market A being larger than market B, i.e. σA ≥ σB.
Prior to the investment by the foreign firm, there is one local firm in each
market, firm a in country A and firm b in country B. The local firms are
assumed to service local demand only. We can think of these firms as facing
prohibitively high costs of entering new markets. One reason could be that
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they are credit constrained and therefore cannot raise the money to pay for
advertisement etc. that would allow them to sell their goods abroad.
A multinational wishes to invest in the region in order to service regional
demand.3 There are two possible modes of entry: Investing in both countries
or investing in one of the two countries and servicing the other through
exports. We will refer to the latter strategy as export platform FDI. Setting
up a plant requires fixed costs F , assumed to be identical in both regions.
Intra-regional exports carry a per unit trade cost t.
Foreign and local firms produce an identical product, but the MNE is
technologically more advanced than the local firms. We normalize the mar-
ginal costs of the multinational to zero, cm = 0. The two local firms are
assumed to be identical in terms of their initial technology, i.e. prior to po-
tential spillovers associated with the foreign investment, with marginal costs
given by c ≥ 0. Here, c also serves as a measure of the initial technology gap
between the multinational and the local firms.
The literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) suggests that techno-
logical spillovers are, at least potentially, significant.4 In addition, Audretsch
and Feldman (1996), Bransetter (2001), and Keller (2001) report that such
spillovers are primarily local in nature, i.e., intra-national, rather than in-
ternational. Typical channels for spillovers include backward and forward
linkages between foreign aﬃliates and local firms, “demonstration eﬀects”,
and labor turnover.
Following this empirical literature, we assume that when the MNE sets
up a plant in a country, some of its technological advantage spills over to the
local competitor in that country. The technological spillovers are assumed
to be local in nature. This means that they occur only in a market where
the MNE is present with a production facility. In our model, spillovers are
simply a fraction s ∈ [0, 1] of the diﬀerence in marginal production costs. i.e.
sc. Thus, post-spillover marginal production costs are given by c − sc. If
s = 0, there are no spillovers. If s = 1, spillovers are suﬃciently strong to
make the local firm equally eﬃcient as the MNE.
The timing of the game is as follows. At stage one, the multinational firm
decides where to invest. At stage two, the firms simultaneously decide on
3Trade costs associated with exporting from the multinational’s home country to the
region are assumed to be prohibitively high, so that access to regional consumers requires
an investment. The trade versus investment choice is well understood from the literature
on horizontal FDI, and it is not the focus of our analysis.
4For a survey, see Blomström and Kokko (1998).
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quantities supplied. The equilibrium is therefore determined by a standard
Nash-Cournot duopoly solution. Operating profits for a the MNE in country
J when present with a local production unit are given by
πIJ =
1
9
σJ (1 + c− sc)2 , (2)
and when reaching market J with exports from K 6= J as
πXJ =
1
9
σJ (1 + c− 2t)2 , (3)
where superscript I indicates investment and X exports. We assume
c < 1
2
to ensure that the local firms make positive profits, and t < 1
2
so
that intra-regional exports is always profitable for the MNE. Total operating
profits in the multi-plant case are denoted by
πII = πIA + πIB =
1
9
(σA + σB) (1 + c− sc)2 , (4)
and in the case of an export platform in J by
πIXJ = πIJ + πXK =
1
9
σJ (1 + c− sc)2 +
1
9
σK (1 + c− 2t)2 . (5)
Profits net of investment costs in the multi-plant case is ΠII = πII − 2F ,
and in the export platform case ΠIXJ = πIXJ −F . The advantage with multi-
plant investment is that trade costs are eliminated since the MNE is present
in both markets. There are two disadvantages with this investment strategy.
First, it requires fixed costs in each market. Second, spillovers increase the
competitiveness of the local competitors in both markets.
The most interesting issue in the investment decision concerns the MNE’s
choice of location in the case of a single plant (export platform case). On
the one hand, locating in the larger market A is attractive since it saves
on trade costs. On the other hand, locating in this market means tougher
competition on a larger share of its total sales, as spillovers close at least part
of the technological gap between the local firm and the multinational.
We begin by analyzing the MNE’s location decision in the absence of
government intervention on the part of the potential host countries. Then
we add the possibility for governments to tax or subsidize the MNE entry, and
describe the optimal policies. We then study the MNE’s entry decision given
these policies. Finally, we calculate the welfare eﬀect for the countries in the
region from introducing an international investment agreement prohibiting
investment incentives.
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2.1 Entry Choice Without Government Intervention
As mentioned earlier, the investment decision problem facing the MNE is
whether to invest in both countries or in a single country, and in the latter
case, in which country to locate. We can think of the investment decision
as a two-stage process. First, the firm considers which country is the more
profitable location for a single-plant investment. Second, it considers whether
or not is shall add an investment in the other, and less profitable, market.
Accordingly, consider first the question of investment location for a single
plant. Using (5) we find that:
πIXA − πIXB =
1
9
(σA − σB) (2t− cs)φ, (6)
where φ ≡ 2 (1− t) + c (2− s) > 0. For πIXA > πIXB , the MNE locates in
A, for πIXA < πIXB , it locates in B. From (6) we see that:
Lemma 1 Without government intervention, the MNE locates a single-plant
investment in the larger market A if 2t > cs, whereas it locates in the smaller
market B if 2t < cs.
If spillovers are suﬃciently important relative to trade costs, the MNE
prefers to establish an export platform in the smaller country. In this case, the
disadvantage of being located at a distance from the main market, country
A, is dominated by the limitation of spillovers that the MNE achieves by
locating in the smaller market. If spillovers are less important relative to
trade costs, the single investment is made in country A. Thus, Lemma 1
describes what we will call a “proximity-protection” trade-oﬀ: The advantage
of being close to the consumers in the larger market must be weighed against
the greater protection of the firm’s technology that locating in the smaller
market provides.5
Consider next the question of multi-plant investment. Let πIIJ ≡ πIJ −
πXJ −F define the added profits from investing in J relative to servicing that
market with exports from K, which using (4) and (5) can be expressed as
πIIJ ≡
1
9
σJφ (2t− sc)− F. (7)
5Empirical evidence for the relevance of the “protection” argument can be found in
Shaver and Flyer (2000). Using data on the location and survival of foreign greenfield
investments in the United States, they find that more technologically advanced firms tend
to locate at some distance from their competitors.
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Define as
F ∗J ≡
1
9
σJφ (2t− sc) (8)
the critical level of fixed costs at which the firm is indiﬀerent between
adding a plant in J or not, i.e. when πIIJ = 0. When πIIJ > 0 (F < F ∗J ), the
MNE prefers to add an investment in J , when πIIJ < 0 (F > F ∗J ), it prefers to
service market J through an export platform in market K. Since, σA > σB
we know that F ∗A > F
∗
B. Hence, multi-plant investment takes place only if
F < F ∗B. If F > F
∗
B, a single-plant investment is made in A. Note also that
F ∗J < 0 if t <
sc
2
. This means that if the export platform is located in the
small country, the MNE never sets up a second plant in the larger country.
The reason is that if spillovers are large, the protection motive is driving the
location decision, and the MNE will restrict its foreign operations to just one
plant.
The investment decision of the MNE in the absence of government inter-
vention can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 (i) If trade costs are low relative to spillovers, such that
2t < sc, the MNE makes a single-plant investment in the smaller country
B. (ii) If trade costs are high relative to spillovers, such that 2t > sc, the
MNE makes a single-plant investment in the larger market A if fixed costs
are above the critical level F ∗B, and invests in both countries if fixed costs are
below this critical level.
The optimal investment decision in the absence of government interven-
tion is illustrated in Figure 1, which measures fixed costs F on the vertical
axis and trade costs t on the horizontal axis.6
Figure 1 captures the proximity-protection trade-oﬀ. Locating in the
smaller country to a larger extent protects the firm’s technology. This takes
place when spillovers are important relative to trade costs, i.e. for t < cs/2.
When spillovers are relatively less important, proximity to the larger market
carries the larger weight in the investment decision. For t > cs/2, the firm
locates in the larger market, and when fixed costs are suﬃciently low, i.e.
below F ∗B, also in the smaller market.
6The Figure is based on c = 13 , s =
1
2 , and σB = 1.
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Figure 1: Location without intervention
2.2 Entry choice with government intervention
So far we have abstracted from government intervention. But clearly, given
the potential gains to the local producers from spillovers, governments may
have an incentive to attract foreign investment through an investment sub-
sidy.7 In this section we describe the policy competition for FDI and analyse
how these policies aﬀect the location decision of the MNE.
FDI has eﬀects on both consumer and producer interests in the host
countries. Quite clearly, consumers gain from FDI relative to imports since it
adds to the competitive pressure in the market and therefore reduces prices.
The eﬀect on local producer surplus is less clear. There are two eﬀects.
On the one hand, local producers dislike the added competition that the
establishment of a foreign aﬃliate implies. On the other hand, there are
technological spillovers that benefit the local producer. When the foreign
firm invests in that market, local profits, µJ , are given by
µIJ =
1
9
σJ (1− 2 (c− cs))2 . (9)
7In practice, investment incentives come in various forms, including tax holidays and
cheap access to public land.
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If the foreign firm reaches market J through exports, the local firm’s
profits are
µXJ =
1
9
σJ (1− 2c+ t)2 . (10)
Let the government maximize net profits, defined as local firm profits
minus net investment subsidies, S. A negative S means a tax.8 When a
foreign firm invests in country J and receives a subsidy S, net profits are
given by:
W IJ = µ
I
J − SJ , (11)
and in case no FDI takes place in the country:
WXJ = µ
X . (12)
The equilibrium subsidy (or tax) is given by a Nash bargaining solution,
with the bargaining strength of the investing firm relative to that of the
host country given by γ. Let SmaxJ represent the reservation price of the host
country, and SminJ the reservation price of the investing firm. The equilibrium
subsidy is therefore:
S∗J = γSmaxJ + (1− γ)SminJ . (13)
We first turn to the host countries’ willingness to pay for the investment,
SmaxJ . This is given by the added local profits from an investment relative to
imports from abroad, i.e. W IJ −WXJ . Using (9) and (10) we find that:
SmaxJ = µ
I
J − µXJ =
1
9
σJ (2cs− t)ψ, (14)
where ψ = t + 2 (1− c (2− s)), which is positive since c < 1
2
and s ≤ 1.
From (14) we see that:
Lemma 2 If t < 2cs⇒ SmaxJ > 0, the country gains from FDI. If t > 2cs⇒
SmaxJ < 0, the country loses from FDI.
Note that SmaxJ is increasing in σJ . Hence, if t < 2cs, the larger country
has more to gain from FDI inflows than the smaller country. On the other
8This means that we abstract from the eﬀect of investment decisions on local consumer
interests. But since this eﬀect is obvious (investment always benefiting consumer interests),
we abstract from this concern.
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hand, if t > 2cs, the larger country loses more than the smaller country from
FDI inflows.
We wish to analyse the consequences of an IIA that eliminates incentives-
based competition for FDI. Hence, the agreement does not regulate the tax-
ation of inward investment. Since taxing FDI is indeed what the countries
would do if t > 2cs, the agreement would not aﬀect the outcome for this
range of trade costs. Hence, we limit our attention to t < 2cs. However,
even for t < 2cs, S∗J may be negative if the location advantage of region
J and the bargaining power of the host government are suﬃciently strong.
This would imply taxing FDI, and the IIA would not aﬀect this policy. If
the bargaining power of the multinational is suﬃciently strong, we know that
S∗J > 0 for all levels of t < 2cs, since S
max
J > 0 for all t < 2cs. Hence, given
suﬃciently strong bargaining power for the MNE, we know that an IIA will
aﬀect host country welfare.
Let us now turn to the reservation price of the investing firm, SminJ . What
is the lowest subsidy that a country msut oﬀer in order to attract an invest-
ment? Again, we start by analysing the single-plant case. The minimum
subsidy of country J is then given by:
SIXminJ = πIXK − πIXJ + SmaxK . (15)
In words, country J must oﬀer a subsidy such that the MNE makes at
least as much money by investing in J as it would by investing in K, given
that K has oﬀered its maximal subsidy. Using (15), we see that SmaxJ −
SIXminJ = S
max
J − SmaxK + πIXJ − πIXK , which implies that
SmaxA − SIXminA = SIXminB − SmaxB . (16)
Hence, if SmaxA > S
IXmin
A , we know that S
IXmin
B > S
max
B , and vice versa.
Using (3) and (14), (15) can be expressed as
SIXminJ =
1
9
(σK − σJ) (2t− sc)φ+
1
9
σK (2cs− t)ψ. (17)
From this expression we can show that:
Lemma 3 SIXminJ = SmaxJ for t ≡ t˜ = 15+
4
5
c− 1
5
√
ξ, where ξ = 1+8c+16c2+
10sc−50sc2+25s2c2 > 0.9 For t < t˜, SIXminB < SmaxB which we know implies
9A second critical t also exists for which , given by t = 15 +
4
5c +
1
5
√
ξ > 2sc. Since
we would then be in the taxation regime, this critical trade cost is not relevant for our
discussion here.
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SIXminA > S
max
A , and for t > t˜, S
IXmin
A < S
max
A , and therefore S
IXmin
B > S
max
B .
We can also show that t˜ < sc
2
, i.e. below the level of trade costs at which the
investor is indiﬀerent between the two locations in the no-intervention case.
Clearly, for a country to be able to attract the single-plant investment,
its willingness to pay, SmaxJ , must exceed the minimum oﬀer it needs to make
to attract the investment, SIXminJ .
Consider next the issue of a second plant in the region. How much does
a country have to pay to induce FDI inflows, given that the foreign firm has
already made an investment in the other country? This is a rather straight-
forward question to answer, since the policy of the rival country is irrelevant:
Countries are now not rivals for a single plant, and there is no policy com-
petition for FDI. The minimum subsidy required by the MNE to invest in
country J , given that it has already invested in K, is given by:
SIIminJ = πXJ −
³
πIJ − F
´
. (18)
Using (2) and (3), (18) can be expressed as
SIIminJ =
1
9
σJ (sc− 2t)φ+ F. (19)
Whether country J will attract a second plant in the region, depends
on whether SIIminJ is smaller or greater than S
max
J . Define the critical fixed
investment cost for which SIIminJ = S
max
J as:
F˜ ∗J ≡
1
9
σJ [(2cs− t)ψ + (2t− sc)φ] . (20)
Clearly, since σA > σB, we see that F˜ ∗A > F˜ ∗B. Hence, for F < F˜ ∗B, there
will be multi-plant investment. For F > F˜ ∗B there will be single-plant in-
vestment in A. We can summarize the investment decision in the investment
subsidy case as:
Proposition 2 (i) If trade costs are low relative to spillovers, i.e. for t < t˜,
SmaxB > S
IXmin
B and the single-plant investment is made in country B. (ii)
For higher trade costs relative to spillovers, i.e. for t > t˜, SmaxA > S
IXmin
A , the
firm makes a single-plant investment in A if fixed costs are above the critical
level F˜ ∗B, and invests in both countries if fixed costs are below this critical
level.
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Figure 2: Location with intervention
Figure 2 illustrates equilibria with government intervention.10
Figure 2 shows that subsidy competition for FDI causes the region in
which there is a single-plant investment in B to shrink. Without intervention,
this was given by t < cs
2
, with intervention by t < t˜ < cs
2
. This is not
surprising, given that the larger country has the larger willingness to pay for
the investment. Figure 2 also shows that for t < 2cs, the area for which multi-
plant investment takes place, increases. Without intervention, this was given
by the area below the F ∗B-curve, with intervention below the F˜
∗
B-curve. Again,
this is not surprising since an investment subsidy makes it more attractive
for the MNE to undertake investment. For t > 2cs, on the other hand,
multi-plant investment becomes less likely, simply because investments are
then taxed.
2.2.1 Welfare implications of an IIA
Table 1 illustrates the location and welfare eﬀects of an IIA that prohibits
the use of investment-incentive policies, given that S∗J > 0 for both countries
10Figure 2 is based on the same parameter values as Figure 1.
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i.e. that the agreement indeed aﬀects the policies of the countries.11
In Table 1, “low” trade costs are t < t˜, “intermediate” trade costs: t ∈³
t˜, cs
2
´
, and “high” trade costs are t ∈
³
cs
2
, 2cs
´
. Similarly, “low” fixed costs
are F < F ∗B, “intermediate” fixed costs are F ∈
³
F ∗B, F˜
∗
B
´
, and “high” fixed
costs are F > F˜ ∗B. “Location” in Table 1 reports the location of FDI in the
absence of investment subsidies, whereas “Location*” reports the outcome
with subsidies.
Table 1. Location and welfare eﬀects of introducing an IIA
Case Trade costs t Fixed costs F Location Location∗ ωA ωB
I Low B B 0 +
II Intermediate High B A − +
III Intermediate Interm. & Low B A+B − +
IV High High A A + 0
V High Intermediate A A+B + −
V I High Low A+B A+B + +
Case I describes the situation where trade cost are very low relative to
spillovers. In this case, the protection of technology argument dominates
both with and without policy intervention. An increase in trade costs relative
to spillovers strengthens the proximity argument of locating in the larger
market. Given the higher subsidies oﬀered by the larger country, the MNE
invests exclusively in A if fixed costs are suﬃciently high (case II), and in
both markets if fixed costs are low or intermediate (case III). Proximity
to the larger market is the dominating force with a further increase in trade
costs relative to spillovers. If fixed costs are high, there will be investment
only in the larger market (case IV ), if fixed costs are at an intermediate
level, investment subsidies lead to an additional plant in the region, located
in country B (case V ), and if investment costs are high the firm invests in
both markets (case V I).
The last two columns of Table 1 describe welfare eﬀects of introducing an
IIA prohibiting the use of investment subsidies. The general picture is that
the small country gains from an IIA for low and intermediate trade costs
(cases I − III), whereas the large country gains for high trade costs (cases
IV−V ). In V I, both countries would gain from an agreement that eliminated
11As discussed above, this is not necessarily the case, even for t < 2cs. This fact will be
clarified in connection with the discussion of Figure 3 below.
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the use of investment incentives, since the MNE invests in both countries even
in the absence of investment incentives. Figure 3 below illustrates the welfare
eﬀects.12 We restrict our attention to the case where subsidies are relevant,
i.e. t < 2cs.
t
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Figure 3: Welfare implications
The regions with roman numbers refer to the cases in Table 1. Note
however the introduction of two new lines relative to Figure 2, namely S∗A
and S∗B. These two lines illustrate, respectively, the combination of fixed
costs and trade costs for which S∗A = 0 and S
∗
B = 0, for a given distribution
of bargaining strength between the investor and the host country. To the
right of the S∗B-line, S
∗
A < S
∗
B < 0, and hence both countries are able to tax
FDI, and would hence be unaﬀected by an IIA. To the right of the S∗B-line,
therefore, ωA = ωB = 0. Between the S∗B-line and the S∗A-line, S∗B > 0 but
S∗A < 0. Hence, in this region only country B has to subsidize FDI. Country
A, due to its larger size and hence stronger location advantage, taxes the
investor. Only B would then be aﬀected by an investment agreement, and
we denote this with superscript zero in the figure. In region V I0, therefore,
ωA = 0,ωB > 0, in region V 0, ωA = 0,ωB < 0, and in region IV 0, ωA =
12Figure 3 is based on the same parameter values as Figures 1 and 2, and in addition
equal bargaining strength between investor and host country, i.e. γ = 12 , and σA =
3
2 .
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ωB = 0. An increase in the bargaining power of the multinational, i.e. an
increase in γ, would shift the S∗B-line and the S∗A-line to the right. Similarly,
a reduction in γ would shift these lines to the left.
Intuitively, the smaller country has a strong location advantage when
trade costs are low relative to spillovers, due to the protection eﬀect. Given
this advantage, the small country would support an IIA, knowing that it
would be the preferred location for FDI after an agreement has been signed.
For high trade costs relative to spillovers, the larger country has the stronger
location advantage, given by the proximity argument. The larger country
would then support an IIA, since the MNE would anyway invest in the larger
country.
We are particularly interested in conflicting interests between the two
countries. In the case of low and intermediate trade costs, country A is either
indiﬀerent to an IIA (case I) or loses from such an agreement (cases II, and
III). For intermediate trade costs, country A dislikes the agreement because
only through subsidies will it be able to attract FDI. For suﬃciently low trade
costs, the larger country is indiﬀerent, since it is unable to attract FDI with
or without subsidies. When trade costs are high relative to spillovers, the
small country may be either indiﬀerent to an IIA (case IV ), lose from such
an agreement (case V ), or gain from the agreement (case V I). Country B
loses in case V since oﬀering a subsidy in this case is the only way for the
country to attract FDI. In case IV the smaller country is indiﬀerent since it
never attracts FDI, with or without subsidies. Hence, only when trade costs
are high and investment costs are low are the two countries’ interests aligned
on the question of an IIA. In this case, the investment agreement precludes
the MNE from entering into negotiations with the two countries which, by
use of the MNE’s bargaining power, would result in investment subsidies for
investments that would take place even without such incentives.
3 Technological diﬀerences
This section addresses a second source of diﬀerences across potential host
countries, namely technology. We do not oﬀer a thorough analysis of the
case with diﬀerence in local technologies, for two reasons. First, it is a more
complex scenario in terms of welfare analysis. Second, the main insights
derived from our analysis above can be applied in a rather straightforward
way also to the case of diﬀerent technologies. The purpose of this section is
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therefore to give the reader a flavor of the analogy and the added complexity.
Let cA > cB > 0, so that the firm in market B is characterized by a higher
technology than the firm in market A. In order to isolate the impact of tech-
nological diﬀerences and their interplay with spillovers on the multinational’s
location decision, we abstract from diﬀerences in market size all together and
assume that both markets are of the same size, i.e. σA = σB = 1.
The location decision is now determined by a “competition-protection”
trade-oﬀ. Ceteris paribus, since the firm in country B is the stronger com-
petitor, the MNE captures a larger market share in market A than in market
B. This is an argument in favor of locating in the market of the low-tech firm,
country A. On the other hand, the MNE wishes to protect its technology.
This is an argument in favor of locating in B, since spillovers to the more
advanced local firm are smaller than to the less advanced local firm. Note the
analogy with our analysis in the previous section, where countries diﬀered in
size only. In that case, country B oﬀered greater protection for the MNE’s
technology because of the smaller size of its market. In the present case,
country B oﬀers the greater protection of technology since the local firm has
less to learn from the MNE. Similarly, country A oﬀers a larger market for
the MNE, either because of a larger market size or because of a less advanced
local firm.
Without policy intervention, allowing for diﬀerences in technology in (5),
the condition πIXA = πIXB can be expressed in terms of trade costs as
t¯ =
1
2
s
µ
1 +
1
2
(cA + cB) (2− s)
¶
. (21)
If t < t¯, the MNE sets up its export platform in country B, whereas if
t > t¯, the MNE invests in country A.13
It is noteworthy that the MNE’s location decision does not depend on
the diﬀerences in technologies in the two markets, but only on the average
technology in the region, i.e. 1
2
(cA + cB). There are two eﬀects: First, a
greater technological advantage in the low-tech country, B, and a stronger
competitor in the high-tech country, A, makes an investment in B relatively
more attractive. At the same time, however, a greater technological advan-
tage implies larger spillovers, thereby reducing the attractiveness of investing
13Note that t > t¯ requires that t¯ < 12 because t is limited to t ∈
¡
0, 12
¢
. Hence,
an export platform in B is only profitable if spillovers are not too large, i.e. if s <
1 +
1−
√
1+(cA+cB)
2
(cA+cB)
< 1. If spillovers are complete (s = 1), the MNE never locates in B.
17
in B. These two eﬀects cancel out as long as the average technology in the
region remains constant.
Similar to the previous analysis, the decision of whether to set up an
export platform versus multi-plant production is determined by the level of
fixed costs F . The equivalent of (8) in the country-size case can be found as:
F ∗J =
1
9
φJ (2t− cJs) , (22)
where φJ = (2 (1− t) + cJ (2− s)). Hence, given that t < 12scJ , F ∗A < F ∗B,
and the MNE sets up an additional plant in country B if F < F ∗A. With
government intervention, the equivalent of (14) is:
SmaxJ =
1
9
(2cJs− t)ψJ , (23)
where ψJ = t + 2 (1− cJ (2− s)) > 0. If t < 2cJs, country J oﬀers a
subsidy, and if t > 2cJs, it levies a tax. This result is similar to the result in
the previous section, only that in this case the switching point from oﬀering
a subsidy to levying a taxes is diﬀerent for the two countries. Since the
low-tech country A has a larger gain from the spillovers, it is more inclined
to oﬀer a subsidy than the high-tech country B. Denote the critical levels
of t for the two countries by tA = 2cAs and tB = 2cBs and note that since
cA > cB, it follows that tA > tB. Then, for t ∈ (tB, tA), country B taxes FDI
while country A oﬀers an investment subsidy. The critical level of trade costs
at which the MNE is indiﬀerent between locating a single-plant investment
in A or B, given investment subsidies, is now given by:
t˜ =
5
4
µ
1
2
(cA + cB) s (2− s)−
1
5
s
¶
, (24)
which has its counterpart in t˜ defined in Lemma 3 in the country-size
case. If t < t˜, the MNE prefers to locate the export platform in country B,
and if t > t˜, in country A. Similarly, we can find the equivalent of (20) as:
F˜ ∗J =
1
9
(2cJs− t)ψJ +
1
9
(2t− cJs)φJ . (25)
The added complexity of the present scenario relative to the case where
only market size diﬀered, is that now it is much more diﬃcult to establish a
ranking of the various critical levels of t
³
t˜, t¯, tA, tB
´
. There are only three
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inequalities that hold for the entire range of admissible parameter values:
tA > tB, t˜ < t¯, and t˜ < tB. The first inequality is a direct consequence
of assuming that B is the high-tech country. It illustrates that the low-tech
country has a higher incentive to oﬀer a subsidy. The second inequality states
that allowing investment subsidies makes an investment platform in the low-
tech country more likely, simply because this country would oﬀer the higher
investment subsidy. The third inequality states that the low-tech country is
indeed able to attract an export platform through subsidies if trade costs are
in the range
³
t˜, tB
´
. This leaves five possible rankings: (i) t˜ < tB < tA < t¯,
(ii) tB < t˜ < tA < t¯, (iii) tB < t˜ < t¯ < tA, (iv) t˜ < tB < t¯ < tA, and (v)
t˜ < t¯ < tB < tA. This clearly illustrates the fact that the technology case is
indeed far more complex than the size case discussed in the previous section.
However, the mechanisms guiding the location outcomes and welfare eﬀects
are similar to the mechanisms discussed in the previous section. Take case
(v) as an example.14 In this case, the location outcome and the welfare eﬀects
are described in Table 2. “Low” trade costs refer to t < t˜, “intermediate”
trade costs to t ∈
³
t˜, t¯
´
, and “high” trade costs to t ∈ (t¯, tb).
Table 2. Location and welfare: The technology case
Case Trade costs t Location Location∗ ωA ωB
I low B B 0 +
II intermediate B A − +
III high A A + 0
The similarity to cases I, II, and IV in table 1 is striking. The results
are driven by the “competition-protection” trade-oﬀ which is essentially very
similar to the “proximity-protection” trade-oﬀ in the previous section.
4 Conclusion
An international investment agreement limiting the use of investment sub-
sidies to attract foreign direct investment, is likely to create winners and
losers amongst host countries. In the present paper we have focussed on
diﬀerences in market size as the source of conflicting interests between host
countries. We have shown that there may be strong market specific reasons
14In case (v) the two potential host countries are fairly similar in terms of technology,
but their disadvantage relative to the MNE is fairly large, so that cb > ca > 12+s .
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for an MNE to invest in the smaller and/or the larger country, either to limit
the spread of technology in the smaller country, or to save on trade costs in
the larger country. If the market specific attractions for investing in a given
country are strong, the MNE is likely to invest in that country even after
an investment agreement prohibiting investment subsidies has been signed.
The relevant host country would in this case welcome an agreement that
eliminates international subsidy competition for FDI. The country gets the
investment anyway, and with an investment agreement, without having to
oﬀer a subsidy to the MNE.
When the market based attraction for investing in a country is not very
strong, however, investment subsidies aﬀect the investment choice of the
MNE. A small country may either benefit or lose from the possibility to
subsidize. It benefits if by oﬀering an investment subsidy it is able to attract
FDI, which it would not get in the absence of such an investment incentive.
It loses, however, if the MNEmakes a single investment in the region, and the
larger country is able to change the investment decision of the MNE from the
small to the large country by oﬀering a more generous investment subsidy.
Conflicting interests between host countries is an indication that negoti-
ations on an investment agreement are likely to be diﬃcult. In addition to
the potentially conflicting views of host countries, there are of course diﬀer-
ences between investor countries, not to mention investor countries versus
host countries.
Naturally, our results are limited by the framework of the analysis. The
setup of our analysis was chosen in order to emphasize the trade-oﬀs in-
volved for both local governments as well as for the multinational enterprise.
We have abstracted from a number of relevant issues, such as product dif-
ferentiation or oligopolistic market structures (beyond duopoly). Product
diﬀerentiation, for instance, reduces the impact of spillovers for the MNE
and thus provides the larger (low-tech) country with a stronger locational
advantage. It could also be interesting to explore strategies for protecting
technology other than choice of location. Finally, it would be interesting to
investigate potential conflicts between diﬀerent investor countries regarding
an IIA, and between investor countries and host countries. We leave this for
future research.
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